Abstract. We present an efficient off-line divisible e-cash scheme which is truly anonymous without a trusted third party. This is the second scheme in the literature which achieves full unlinkability and anonymity, after the seminal work proposed by Canard and Gouget. The main trick of our scheme is the use of a bounded accumulator in combination with the classical binary tree approach. The aims of this paper are twofold. Firstly, we analyze Canard and Gouget's seminal work on the efficient off-line divisible e-cash. We point out some subtleties on the parameters generation of their scheme. Moreover, spending a coin of small value requires computation of several hundreds of multi-based exponentiations, which is very costly. In short, although this seminal work provides a new approach of achieving a truly anonymous divisible e-cash, unfortunately it is rather impractical. Secondly, we present our scheme that uses a novel approach of incorporating a bounded accumulator. In terms of time and space complexities, our scheme is 50 to 100 times more efficient than Canard and Gouget's work in the spend protocol at the cost of an 10 to 500 (the large range is due to whether pre-processing is taken into account and the probabilistic nature of our withdrawal protocol) times less efficient withdrawal protocol. We believe this trade-off between the withdrawal protocol and the spend protocol is reasonable as the former protocol is to be executed much less frequent than the latter. Nonetheless, while their scheme provides an affirmative answer to whether divisible e-cash can be truly anonymous, our result puts it a step further and we show that truly anonymous divisible e-cash can be practical.
Introduction
Electronic cash (e-cash) was introduced by Chaum [15] in 1982. In its simplest form, an e-cash system consists of three parties (the bank B, the user U and the merchant M) and four main procedures, namely, account establishment, withdrawal, spending and deposit. The user U first performs an account establishment protocol with the bank B. The currency circulating around is quantized as This paper is the extended version of the paper to appear in FC 2008 under the same title [3] .
coins. U obtains a coin by performing a withdrawal protocol with B and spends the coin by participating in a spend protocol with M. To deposit a coin, S performs a deposit protocol with B.
A practical electronic cash system should be secure, offline and anonymous. An e-cash system is offline when the spend protocol does not require B's participation. In a secure e-cash system, only B can produce a valid electronic coin and users who double-spent the same coin should be identified. The problem of double-spending occurs in the electronic world due to the digital coins ease of duplication. Additionally, honest spenders cannot be slandered to have doublespent (exculpability), and when M deposits the money from the payee, B should not be able to trace who the actual spender is (anonymity). In a truly anonymous e-cash, B, even with the help of M, cannot obtain any information about the identity of the payee. In particular, spending of the same payee cannot be linked together (sometimes refer to as unlinkability).
High efficiency is also of key importance for practical e-cash systems. For efficiency, we look at: (1) the time and bandwidth needed for the withdrawal, spend and deposit protocols; (2) the size of an electronic coin; and (3) the size of the bank's database. In particular, it is desirable if several coins can be withdrawn or spent more efficiently than repeating several times a single withdrawal or spending protocol.
Related Results
In a compact e-cash system [9, 4] , users can withdraw efficiently a wallet W containing 2 L coins. However, these coins must be spent one by one. Users in a divisible e-cash system can efficiently withdraw a wallet W containing 2 L coins (à la compact e-cash). However, these 2 L coins can be spent together efficiently. In particular, spending 2 , ≤ L, coins together can be done more efficiently than repeating the spend protocol for 2 times.
A lot of divisible e-cash exists in the literature [24, 25, 16, 17, 23, 14, 21, 12] . Nonetheless, with the exception of [12] , none of the above divisible e-cash system is truly anonymous. For instance, everyone can tell whether the spending in [23, 14] is from the same wallet (i.e., linkable). In [21] , there exists a trusted party who can revoke the identity of every spender (also known as fair e-cash [13] ). Moreover, which part of the wallet that is being used is known. That is, if the payee of transaction one and the payee of transaction two are using the same part of a wallet, everyone can conclude that these two transactions are indeed performed with different wallets. We shall investigate the practicality of the only truly anonymous divisible e-cash scheme [12] in the next subsection. On the other hand, in contrast to the divisible e-cash schemes, existing compact e-cash schemes [9, 4, 2] are all truly anonymous.
On the Practicality of the Truly Anonymous Divisible E-Cash
in [12] We analyze the Canard and Gouget's scheme from [12] . To allow efficeint withdrawal of 2 L coins, the construction in [12] requires a series of L+2 cyclic groups (G = g , G 1 = g 1 , . . . , G L+1 = g L+1 ) such that G i ⊂ Z * |Gi+1| for i = 1 to L + 1 and G ⊂ Z * |G 1 | 1 and the decisional discrete logarithm assumption (DDH) holds in all G i . However, whether such series of groups exists, for moderate L (say, L = 10), is unknown. The authors suggest using the same setting of groups in [21] which proposes to set |G i |, for i = 1 to L + 1, to be of prime order and assume |G i+1 | = 2|G i | + 1 for i = 1 to L + 1. This implies finding a series of primes p 1 , . . . , p L+1 such that p i+1 = 2p i + 1. Again, whether such series of primes exist, for moderate L, is unknown and it is also unknown how these series of primes can be efficiently generated. The authors in [21] propose using a brute-force approach. That is, randomly generate an odd number n (equals to order of group G) and test if p 1 := 2n + 1 is a prime. If yes, compute and test if p 2 := 2p 1 + 1 is prime. Continue until p L+1 := 2p L + 1 is also a prime. A well-known result, the prime number theory, states that the number of primes not exceeding m is approximately m ln(m) . Thus, probability that a k-bit odd number is a prime is about 2 k ln 2 . For a randomly generated k-bit odd number n, probability that (p 1 , . . . , p L+1 ) are primes such that p i+1 := 2p i + 1 and
. Taking k = 170 and L = 10, probability of obtaining such series of prime numbers on a given k-bit odd number n is about 2 −66 . In fact, in [21] , n is taken to be an RSA-modulus (which is normally of 1024-bit), and the corresponding probability is 2 −94 . Therefore, it is questionable whether the systems in [21] or [12] are in fact implementable.
The spend protocol in [12] is also quite inefficient. As mentioned in the same paper, the authors regard spending a single coin as quite an expensive operation. It is due to the need of L "1-out-of-2 zero-knowledge proof-of-knowledge of of double discrete logarithm". For a cheating probability of 2 −t , a single zeroknowledge proof-of-knowledge of double discrete logarithms requires t exponentiations. For a cheating probability of 2 −40 and a moderate L (say 10), spending a single coin requires 2 * 40 * 10 = 800 exponentiations. Details analysis of the cost of each protocol can be found in Section 5. Nonetheless, while [12] provides an affirmative answer to whether divisible e-cash can be truly anonymous, it is fair to say constructing a practical divisible e-cash which is truly anonymous is not as easy.
Our Approach
The construction of our divisible e-cash is derived from the classical binary tree approach [23, 21, 14, 12] , in combination with the use of a bounded accumulator [4] . We make use of the bounded accumulator to make a trade-off between computational cost during the withdrawal protocol and the spend protocol. The cost (computational and bandwidth) of our withdrawal protocol and spend protocol is O(L) and O(1), respectively, while the corresponding figures for [12] is O (1) and O(Lt). Since the spending protocol is executed much more frequently than the withdrawal protocol, our system is much more desirable in practice.
The trade-off is achieved with the use of accumulators [7, 5] . During the withdrawal protocol, the user computes the accumulation of the binary tree into L + 1 accumulator values (V 1 , . . . , V L+1 ) and obtains L + 1 signatures. In the spending protocol, if a node of level is to be used, the user only needs to compute a zero-knowledge proof-of-knowledge such that the node he is about to use is inside the accumulator V . In this way, our spend protocol achieves a complexity of O (1) .
An obvious way to ensure the user honestly accumulates node values that form a binary tree, while maintaining anonymity, is to require the user to produce zero-knowledge proof-of-knowledge such that these set of accumulator values (V 1 , . . . , V L+1 ) is correctly formed. This approach, however, is inefficient. Another approach is to apply the cut-and-choose method in a straight-forward manner. Specifically, the user prepares k sets of value, submits them all to the bank who requires the user to reveal k − 1 of them in random. The bank checks if these k − 1 sets of value are honestly generated and signs the remaining one if the check is successful. To ensure that a user cannot cheat, k has to be large. Thus, this approach is inefficient as well.
Luckily, bounded accumulator gives us the possibility of a third solution, which is a modification of the cut-and-choose method. Our approach is statistical, that is, a cheating user might spend more than what he withdraws for a particular withdrawal protocol but in a long run, the bank is guaranteed that users cannot spend more than they withdraw on average. The idea is derived from the following fact: since the accumulator we use is bounded, the user can only accumulate a predefined number of values regardless of whether they are cheating or not. Naturally, there is an upper bound for which a cheating user might gain. In our scheme, the cheating user can get at most a monetary value of L2 L , compared with a value of 2 L for an honest user. If the bank inspects the withdrawal protocol every two withdrawal requests and imposes a fine of monetary value 2L2
L if a user is found cheating, the bank is guaranteed it will not lost money on average. In Section 3, we will formally define the security model for divisible e-cash schemes that employ this kind of statistical approach. In particular, the gain of a cheater cannot be large; since if the gain is large, a cheater might not be able to pay the fine if he is caught. Secondly, a large gain gives extra incentive for people to cheat.
Our Contributions. We propose a practical offline divisible e-cash without a trusted third party which is truly anonymous (unlinkable). We formalize the security model of divisible e-cash scheme that employs a statistical approach and prove that our construction is secure under this model. We compare the efficiency of our construction to that of [12] and shows that our system can be more than 50 to 100 times more efficient, in terms of time and space, in the spending protocol.
Paper Outline. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present preliminary information on the various cryptographic tools and assumptions used in our construction. Security model of divisible e-cash is presented in Section 3. We present our construction in Section 4 and its efficiency analysis in Section 5. Finally we conclude in Section 6.
Preliminaries

Pairing
A pairing is a bilinear mapping from two group elements to a group element. Letê be a bilinear map such thatê : G 1 × G 2 → G 3 and the following holds.
-G 1 and G 2 are cyclic multiplicative groups of prime order p.
-Each element of G 1 , G 2 and G 3 has unique binary representation.
-g, h are generators of G 1 and G 2 respectively.
G 1 and G 2 can be the same or different groups. We say that two groups (G 1 , G 2 ) are a bilinear group pair if the group action in G 1 , G 2 and the bilinear mapping e are all efficiently computable.
Mathematical Assumptions
Security of our construction depends on the following existing mathematical assumptions, namely, Decisional Diffie-Hellman, Symmetric External Diffie-Hellman [1] , q-Strong Diffie-Hellman [8] and AWSM [4] . Their definition is given below. 
Definition 4 (AWSM [4] 2 ). The AWSM problem in a bilinear group pair a 2 , a 3 , s) is not equal to the output of O on input M, t. We say that the AWSM assumption holds in G 1 , G 2 if no PPT algorithm has non-negligible advantage in solving the AWSM problem.
In [4] , the AWSM assumption is proven in the generic group model for a bilinear group pair such that the SXDH holds. On the other hand, AWSM assumption does not hold in groups where SXDH assumption does not hold.
Useful Tools
Zero-Knowledge Proof of Knowledge. In zero-knowledge proof of knowledge [19] , a prover proves to a verifier that a statement is true without revealing anything other than the veracity of the statement. Our construction involves statements related to knowledge of discrete logarithms constructed over a cyclic group G of prime order p. These proofs can also be used non-interactively by using the FiatShamir heuristic [18] . The non-interactive counter part is referred to as signature proof of knowledge, or SPK for short. They are secure in the random oracle model [6] . Following the notation introduced by Camenisch and Stadler [11] , P K{(x) : y = g x } denotes a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge protocol between a prover and a verifier such that the prover knows some x ∈ Z p such that y = g x ∈ G. Construction of this proof first appeared in the Schnorr Identification [26] . The corresponding non-interactive signature proof of knowledge shall be denoted as
ESS+ Signature. Extended special signature (ESS) was introduced in [4] . It allows signing a block of messages, one of which being an element in a cyclic group G. The authors also proposed two protocols, namely, signature generation protocol and signature possession protocol. The signature generation protocol allows a user to obtain a signature from the signer on message M in G, together with a block of messages m 1 , . . . , m L in a commitment. The signer learns nothing about m 1 , . . . , m L while he knows M . The signature possession protocol allows a user to conduct a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge on a message signature pair. ESS scheme is uf-cma secure [20] under the AWSM assumption. We modify the signing protocol of ESS so that the signer learns nothing on the block of messages to be signed as well. We refer this modified signature scheme as ESS+ Signature, which is outlined in Appendix A. ESS+ signature is uf-cma secure in the standard model under the AWSM assumption. We would like to remark that AWSM is a strong assumption, as it requires bilinear group pair where the SXDH assumption [1] holds.
Bounded Accumulator. The notion, bounded accumulator was introduced in [4] as an accumulator with a limit q as the maximum number of elements that can be accumulated. We briefly review their construction here.
Let G 1 , G 2 be a bilinear group pair. Let u 0 be a random element in G 1 and v 0 be a random element in G 2 . Let q be the bound of the accumulator. The generation algorithm randomly selects α ∈ Z * p and computes u i = u 0
To accumulate a set of q values (e 1 , . . . , e k ), the evaluation algorithm computes the accumulator value V = u k=q k=1 (e k +α) 0
. This operation does not require knowledge of α since the u i 's are published. A witness w i such that value e i is accumulated in the accumulator V is computed by
. The witness-value pair shall satisfyê(
. Construction of Zeroknowledge proof of knowledge on a value-witness pair can be found in [22] .
Syntax
A (statistical) divisible e-cash is a tuple (BankSetup, UserSetup, WithdrawalProtocol, SpendProtocol, DepositProtocol, RevokeDoubleSpender, VerifyGuilt) of seven polynomial time algorithms/protocols between three entities the bank B, the merchant M and the user U.
-BankSetup. On input an unary string 1 λ , where λ is the security parameter, the algorithm outputs B's key pair bpk, bsk, which includes wallet size L, punishment P if a user is found cheating in Inspection Routine(to be discussed) and frequency of which Inspection Routine is carried out K. -UserSetup. On input bpk, the algorithm outputs a key pair (pk U , sk U ) (resp.
(pk M , sk M )) for U (resp. M). -WithdrawalProtocol. U with input (pk U , sk U ) wishes to withdraws a wallet W of 2 L coins from B (with input (bpk, bsk). This protocol consists of two routines, namely, Withdrawal Routine and Inspection Routine, respectively. These two routines share the same steps in the beginning such that the user is not aware which routine the bank selects. At a particular point in the protocol, the bank chooses one of these two routines.
• Withdrawal Routine. With probability
Routine is executed. The user obtains a wallet W after executing the protocol, while the bank (possibly) retains certain information τ w , called the trace information.
• Inspection Routine. With probability 1 K , Inspection Routine is executed. Inspection Routine outputs pass/cheat. If the output is cheat, a fine of P shall be deducted from the user account. If the output is pass, the user is asked to restart WithdrawalProtocol from the beginning.
-SpendProtocol. This is the protocol when U (with input W, pk M ) spends a divisible coin of value 2 ( ≤ L and is decided by the user) to M. After the protocol, M obtains a coin serial number S , a proof of validity π S , and possibly some auxiliary information aux, and outputs 0/1, depending whether the payment is accepted. U's output is an updated wallet W . -DepositProtocol. M submits (S , π S , aux) to B for deposit in this protocol.
B outputs 0/1, indicating whether the deposit is accepted. B computes, from S , 2 serial numbersS 1 , . . . ,S 2 . If any of the serial numbersS i already belongs to L (the database of spent coins), B invokes the RevokeDoubleSpender algorithm to find out the double-spender. Otherwise, it addsS i , S , π S , aux to L. -RevokeDoubleSpender. Formally, on input two spending protocol transcripts involving the same coin, the algorithm outputs the public key pk of the double-spender. -VerifyGuilt. This algorithm allows the public to verify that the user with public key pk is guilty of double-spending. In particular, when the bank uses RevokeDoubleSpender and outputs π D and pk of the double-spender, everyone can check if the bank is honest.
Requirements:
-(Correctness for User.) It is required whenever an honest user obtains W from the bank who might be dishonest, an honest merchant shall output 1 when the user engage with the merchant in SpendProtocol. -(Correctness for Merchant.) It is required whenever an honest merchant obtains (S , π S , aux) from some execution of SpendProtocol with some user who might be dishonest, there is a guarantee that this transaction will be accepted by the honest bank.
3
-(Practicality.) It is required that P should be small enough so that the fine is payable. For example, if P = (2 L ) 2 , it is very likely that even when a user is found cheating in Inspection Routine, he is unable to pay the fine. In practice, we suggest P ≤ KL2 L .
Security Notions
We describe informally the security requirements of a statistical divisible e-cash system. A secure statistical divisible e-cash scheme should possess, statistical balance, IdentificationOfDoubleSpender, anonymity and exculpability, introduced as follows. The reader may refer to Appendix C for the formal version of these definitions.
-Statistical Balance. This is the most important requirement from the bank's point of view. Roughly speaking, balance means that no collusion of users and merchants together can deposit more than they withdraw without being identified. Statistical Balance means that, in a long run, the balance property is guaranteed. Statistical Balance is a relaxation of balance since it does not rule out the possibility that a user might cheat without being detected and gain a certain advantage within a small number of times. However, in a long run, no successful strategy would allow collusion of users and merchants to deposit more than they withdraw without being identified.
In particular, what we wish to model is the following situation. The bank does not check every withdrawal request. However, if the user cheats during the withdrawal, at most he can gain a monetary value P . If the bank only checks once every K transactions and imposes a fine of KP for each caught cheating, the Statistical Balance property will be achieved. It turns out that this relaxation greatly increase the efficiency of our system. -Anonymity. It is required that no collusion of users, merchants and the bank can ever learn the spending habit of an honest user. In particular, spending of the same user cannot be linked. -Exculpability. It is required that an honest user cannot be proven to have double-spent, even all other users, merchants and the bank collude.
A statistical divisible e-cash is said to be secure if it has Statistical Balance, Anonymity and Exculpability.
Construction
In this section, we describe our cryptographic construction in detail and assess its security, after giving a high level description.
High Level Description
Following the terminology of [9, 12] , spending a single electronic coin consists of generating a serial number S, which is used to detect double-spending, a security tag T , which is used to reveal identity of the double-spender should the underlying coin is being spent twice. The spender has to prove to the merchant that the pair (S, T ) is well-formed. Nonetheless, we provide an overview of our system as follows.
The Setup Procedure. The bank B generates ESS+.pk, ESS+.sk pair of the ESS+ Signature. The bank also generates the public parameters of the bounded accumulator as Acc 1 , . . . , Acc L+1 . Let LF , RF be two secure cryptographic hash functions. Let H be another secure cryptographic hash function. Let G = g be a cyclic group of prime order p such that DDH assumption holds. Let g U , h be additional generators of G.
The Account Establishment Procedure. User Alice establishes an account with the bank B by selecting x ∈ Z * p and computes P K Alice := g x U . She sends P K Alice to B, along with a zero-knowledge proof-of-knowledge of the corresponding secret key x.
The Withdrawal Procedure. Suppose user Alice, who has already established an account with the bank, wishes to withdraw a wallet containing 2 L coins. She first randomly chooses a wallet secret w and computes a binary tree of L + 1 level as follows. The root note N 0,0 is assigned the node key value k 0,0 := w. For  all nodes N i,j , the left children, N i+1,2j , is assigned a node key value k i+1,2j := LF (g ki,j ). Similarly, the right children, N i+1,2j+1 , is assigned a node key value k i+1,2j+1 := RF (g k i,j ). Let T w be the resulting binary tree computed by Alice. Fig.4.1 illustrates a construction of a binary tree with L = 3. 4 to Bob, where π S is an non-interactive zero-knowledge proof-of-knowledge of the following:
:
Bob accepts the payment if π S is a valid proof. Alice marked N 0,0 , N 1,0 , N 2,0 , N 2, 1 , N 3,0 , N 3,1 , N 3,2 , N 3,3 as used nodes.
The Deposit Procedure. Bob sends (S, T, π, R, ) to the bank for deposit. The bank checks if R is fresh (that is, if R has been used before by Bob). If the check is successful, then credit Bob's account.
The bank then tries to detect if the coin S has been double-spent. Let S be the serial number of a coin of monetary value 2 . Let N i,j be the corresponding node of the binary tree. From S, the bank computes the 2 serial numbers corresponding to the leaves of subtree of node N i,j by repeatedly applying the functions LF (·), RF (·) and g (·) .
For each serial number S i , the bank checks if it exists in the database. If not, it stores (S i , S, T, R, π) in its database. Suppose there exists another entry in the database (S i , S , T , R , π ), the bank runs the identify procedure discussed in the following subsection.
Example: Depositing a coin of 4 dollars. Continuing our example, Bob submits (S, T, π S , R, 2) to the bank for deposit after getting 4 dollars from Alice. The bank verifies is a valid proof and R is fresh and credits Bob. From S, the bank computes S 0 , . . . , S 3 as follows. Compute intermediate valueS 0 = g LF (S) and
) . The bank checks if S 0 , S 1 , S 2 , S 3 exists in its database of spent-coins. If not, it stores (S 0 , S 1 , S 2 , S 3 , S, T, π S , R) in the database.
The Identify (Double-Spender) Procedure. On input two entries (S i , S, T , R, π) and (S i , S , T , R , π ), the bank computes the identity of the doublespender as follows. If S and S are the same, compute P K cheater := (
On the other hand, if S and S are different, S and S must be of different monetary value. Without loss of generality, assume the monetary value of coin with serial number S is greater than that of S . The bank can compute the node key k i,j such that S = g ki,j from S by repeatedly applying the LF (·), RF (·), g (·) in suitable order. From k i,j , the bank computes pk cheater =
T h R k i,j
and obtains identity of the double-spender.
Example: Catching Double-Spender. Continuing our example. Assuming Alice spends another 2 dollars to Bob, this time using the node N 2,1 in an attempt to over-spends her wallet. Assume the resulting transcript is (S , T , π S , R , 1). When Bob submits this transcript for deposit, the bank will identify it as a double-spent coin since S 1 := g LF (S ) will be equal to S 3 in the above example. The bank can then compute, from S in the above example, k 2,1 = RF (S). From k 2,1 , the bank computes P K cheater := T h R k 2,1 such that P K cheater = P K Alice . This completes the high-level description of our system.
System Construction.
Bank's Setup. Let 2 L be the size of a wallet in the system. Let λ be a security parameter. On input λ, generate a λ-bit prime p. Generate a bilinear group pair of order p. That is,ê : The bank randomly chooses
The public key of the bank is bpk := λ,ê,
The private key of the bank is bsk := X ∈ G 1 , y ∈ G 2 . Remarks: The α i 's are no longer needed and the bank shall delete them. Later we shall see knowledge of α i helps breaking the balance property of the scheme, while, it does not help breaking anonymity or exculpability. Thus, we shall believe the bank to delete those values since keeping them is exactly against its interest.
User Account Establishment. User Alice chooses x as her private key and computes P K Alice = {g 
to Alice. Alice computes
and set W :
. 5 This computation does not require knowledge of α i . It can be computed using
) \\ H 0 for left children else \\ Right children of parent node ki,j := H1(g
) \\ H1 for right children 1. Bob sends to Alice a random challenge m.
Alice computes M = H(I, m). She computes serial number of the coin S = g ki,j S
and security tag
. She also computes a proof of correctness Π S such that S, T are correctly formed as follows:
where VerifyGuilt The algorithm RevokeDoubleSpender can be executed by the public. Thus, a proof that the bank is outputting the double-spender honestly is to publish two double-spent transcript.
Security Analysis
Regarding the security of our construction, we have the follow theorem whose proof can be found in Appendix D. Theorem 1. Our construction is secure under the q-SDH assumption and the AW SM assumption in the random oracle model. Table 1 summarizes the complexities of different protocols of our scheme and the scheme in [12] . The cost of the protocol with pre-processing of our scheme is listed as a reference. It is somehow hard to quantify the exact cost of the spend protocol in [12] as the instantiation of the SPK is very complex. Furthermore, it involves L + 1 cyclic groups of different orders. We simplify the comparison by stating the total number of group elements needed. If the Strong RSA-based CL signature [10] is used, as stated in [12] , the group G in the paper would be the group of quadratic residue modulus a safe-prime product n, which would be of 1024-bit. t is the security parameter controlling the cheating probability of the proof-of-knowledge of double-discrete logarithm. For example, t = 80 would give the protocol a cheating probability of 2 −80 . For a moderate value L = 10 and t = 40, spending a coin of monetary value 1 in [12] requires 816 and 857 multi-based exponentiations from the user and the merchant respectively, and a total bandwidth of 981 elements in Z * |G| and 28 elements in G. If the base group is of order n which is 1024-bit, each of the above elements is at least 1024-bit in size. On a contrary, spending a coin of any monetary value in our scheme requires a constant cost of 21 and 13 multibased exponentiations from the user and the merchant respectively. And a total bandwidth of 9 elements in G and 21 elements in Z * |G| is needed.
Efficiency Analysis
Conclusion
We presented an efficient off-line divisible e-cash scheme which is truly anonymous. While [12] shows that truly anonymous off-line divisible e-cash can be constructed, in this paper, we provided one step further by providing an affirmative answer whether a practical and efficient off-line divisible e-cash can be constructed. Our scheme is very efficient and practical (c.f. [12] A ESS+ Signature.
Let (G 1 , G 2 ) be a bilinear group pair as discussed. Let g, g A , g B , g 0 , g 1 , . . . , g k be random elements of G 1 , h be random elements in G 2 . The signing key is a pair
To sign a block of messages (M, (A, B, C, a, b) .
To verify a signature, the verifier checks if the following holds:
Note that the pairingsê(g, h),ê(g i , h) (i = 0, . . . , k) can be pre-computed or regarded as public parameters.
In the signature generation protocol, a user obtains a signature on (M , m 1 , . . ., m k ) such that the signer learns nothing about the messages being signed. This protocol is different from the one in [4] . In [4] , the protocol is somehow "hybrid" such that M , but not m 1 , . . . , m k , is known to the signer. The protocol consists of three steps.
The user computes (C
The user sends (C 1 , C 2 , π C2 ) to the signer, where π C2 is an non-interactive proof of knowledge of the presentation of C 2 to bases g B , g 0 , g 1 , . . . , g k 6 . 2. The signer verifies π C2 and proceeds only if it is valid. it selects c, b The signature possession protocol allows a user to demonstrate possession of a message signature pair to any third parties without revealing the signature nor the messages signed. It consists of three steps and can be converted into noninteractive form using Fiat-Shamir heuristic [18] . The details of the construction can be found in [4] .
B Instantiation of SPK
The details of SPK Π S in SpendProtocol is presented as follows.
SP KΠ S Signing. To produce a proof Π S for on message M , do the following.
Produce auxiliary commitments (T
where Π I is a signature proof of knowledge of:
. . . g k m k }(R) for some randomly generated R will serve the purpose.
3. Return valid if c equals:
C Security Games
We use a game-based approach to define the security formally. The adversary's capabilities are modeled by arbitrary and adaptive queries to oracles. The oracles are defined as follows.
-UserSetup. This oracle allows the adversary A to add a user into the system. Upon invocation, this oracle act as the bank and engage with the adversary A in the UserSetup protocol. The public key pk presented by A is added to a set X A -Withdrawal. This oracle allows the adversary A to withdraw money from an honest bank. Upon invocation, A presents a public key pk ∈ X A and engages in the WithdrawalProtocol as a user to obtain a wallet. A can choose whether Inspection Routine is to be run or not. -Spend. This oracle allows the adversary A to act as a merchant to receive payment from an honest user. Upon invocation, A specific the monetary value to be paid. The oracle stores the total monetary value paid to A in a counter q O . -Hash. A can ask for the values of the hash functions for any input.
Statistical Balance. What we wish to model in statistical balance is that the maximum gain of an adversary A is P for an cheating WithdrawalProtocol request. (A cheating WithdrawalProtocol request is an attempt to run WithdrawalProtocol with the bank such that if Inspection Routine is being executed, the output will be cheat). Specifically, we wish to model the case when the adversary runs q 1 honest WithdrawalProtocol and q 2 cheating WithdrawalProtocol, he can only get 2 L q 1 + P q 2 monetary value. To model this fact, we introduce a new entity called a moderator M whose only purpose is to decide if an withdrawal request is valid or not. By valid we mean if Inspection Routine is being run, the output shall be pass. Formally, the game statistical Balance is defined as follows. The advantage of A is defined as the probability that A wins.
Anonymity. The following game between a challenger C and an adversary A formally defines anonymity.
Definition 6 (Game Anonymity).
- Exculpability. The following game between a challenger C and an adversary A formally defines exculpability. The advantage of A is defined as the probability that A wins.
Definition 7 (Game Exculpability
)
D Proof of Theorem 1
We sketch the proof for Theorem 1 in the following three subsections, one for each security requirement.
Statistical Balance. Let A be an adversary that makes q O spend queries. We outline why the success probability of A is negligible under the q 2 L -SDH assumption and the AW SM assumption, by constructing a simulator S acting as challenger C (and Moderator M). For each spending query, C simply simulates the HVZK protocol using a value w as a wallet secret. The simulation is perfect since the protocol is HVZK.
Finally, A deposits W +q O dollars. If the deposit transcript consists of coins of value 2 , generate the 2 serial numbers associated with it. A wins the game either by (1) all the W + q O serial numbers during deposit are unique or (2) some of the serial numbers are duplicated but RevokeDoubleSpender on the corresponding deposit attempt does not output a pk ∈ X A . Now we are to analyze these two cases separately.
Case ( The fake proof of possession of ESS+ Signature happens with negligible probability under the AW SM assumption. The fake proof that S (and T ) are well-formed happens with negligible probability under the discrete logarithm assumption. Thus A's success probability is negligible in Case (1).
Case (2): We have shown in case (1) that A cannot convince an S to accept an invalid serial number with non-negligible probability. We now suppose duplicated S are accepted. Due to the zero-knowledge property of the Spend Protocol, A learns nothing about the message-signature pair. Thus, A cannot produce valid
